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		<title>Intel Dump</title>
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		<ttl>15</ttl>
		<description>Phillip Carter on national security and the military.</description>
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		<copyright>Copyright 2009</copyright>
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			<title>Phil Carter&apos;s Status Update</title>
			<description>As you may have guessed from this blog&apos;s hibernation over the past few months, I have taken an indefinite leave of absence from writing to pursue other professional projects. I have greatly enjoyed the opportunity to blog on national security for The Washington Post, and to engage in discussions with you -- my readers -- over the six years that I have been writing Intel Dump. Thank you all for your readership and support.&lt;br clear=&quot;both&quot; style=&quot;clear: both;&quot;/&gt;
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			<pubDate>Thu, 23 Apr 2009 17:26:25 -0500</pubDate>
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			<title>Is It the Economy (Again), Stupid?</title>
			<description>By Janine Davidson Erin was right in her prediction that the economic crisis would squeeze out much of the foreign policy discussion in Friday night&apos;s presidential debate. And given today&apos;s events, the economy will no doubt continue to dominate campaign discussions. But are we headed for a repeat of 1992, when Bill Clinton&apos;s motto -- &quot;it&apos;s the economy, stupid&quot; -- turned out to be the key to the election? When incumbent President George H.W. Bush found that the first Iraq war couldn&apos;t help him to a win? Although the stars seem to be aligning that way, we shouldn&apos;t write off national security as a major campaign issue just yet. Sure, as a national security scholar, I&apos;m a bit biased about the importance of these issues. But it&apos;s not 1992 all over again. And here&apos;s why. Back then, the Gulf War was hardly considered an existential threat to the United States.</description>
			<link>http://voices.washingtonpost.com/inteldump/2008/09/is_it_the_economy_again_stupid.html?wprss=inteldump</link>
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			<pubDate>Mon, 29 Sep 2008 16:56:14 -0500</pubDate>
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			<title>The Greatest Threat?</title>
			<description>By Clint Douglas As Erin wrote, it&apos;s not clear how much foreign policy the candidates will talk about tonight. When they do get around to debating their differing visions of America&apos;s place in the world, however, they&apos;ll likely be confronted by the perennial question: &quot;What is the greatest threat to America&apos;s national security?&quot; It&apos;s not a very good question. It traditionally lends itself to sweeping generalizations that are light on specifics and concrete policy proposals. But how the candidates grapple with an answer will shed some much needed light on what will be their national security priorities for the next four years. What would my answer be? Pakistan. Pakistan&apos;s parlous state constitutes a direct threat to the United States, and more so than any other country or individual terrorist group. In its 60-year history, Pakistan has rarely functioned as a state, regardless of who happened to control the reigns of</description>
			<link>http://voices.washingtonpost.com/inteldump/2008/09/the_greatest_threat.html?wprss=inteldump</link>
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			<pubDate>Fri, 26 Sep 2008 17:36:40 -0500</pubDate>
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			<title>So Much for the Foreign Policy Election</title>
			<description>By Erin Simpson Well, after last minute &quot;will-he-or-won&apos;t-he&quot; drama, it looks like we&apos;re gonna have ourselves a debate tonight. But will it focus on foreign policy (the agreed upon topic) or instead the bailout and this week&apos;s market histrionics? That seems like anybody&apos;s guess. And while my professional interests are generally confined to counter-insurgency and related military matters, I don&apos;t think the candidates are going to get any points in the David Galula drinking game tonight. Here&apos;s what I&apos;ll be looking for in the debate: 1) An understanding that the financial crisis and resulting bailouts do not exist in a vacuum. They affect the candidates&apos; options for both foreign and domestic policy. We can save the latter discussion for the next debate. Tonight, I want to hear how these recent events may affect Pentagon procurement, planned &quot;plus-ups&quot; for the Army and Marine Corps, and other international commitments. 2) Reflection on</description>
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			<pubDate>Fri, 26 Sep 2008 15:48:37 -0500</pubDate>
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			<title>Thou Shalt Not</title>
			<description>By Robert Bateman Back in late 1991, my battalion deployed to the Sinai Desert as a part of the Multinational Force and Observers. This force, consisting of military forces from eleven different nations, stands on the border between Egypt and Israel and ensures that both sides are adhering to the terms of the Camp David Accords. The mission is to &quot;Observe, Report, and Verify&quot; any violations or potential violations. It is an appropriate application of military resources, but it is also boring. Extremely boring. During that six-month tour in the desert, I had a lot of time on my hands. We all did. But I did learn a few things over the course of the deployment. I learned, for example, about chief warrant officers, two of which deployed with us. Warrant officers are a special breed in the United States military. Technically they are officers, but instead of a having</description>
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			<pubDate>Fri, 26 Sep 2008 11:02:34 -0500</pubDate>
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			<title>LPC Marksmanship*</title>
			<description>By Robert Bateman The United States Army seems to have a nearly limitless capacity to screw things up by the numbers. We do a lot of things well, even under the most trying conditions imaginable. But it might be fair to say that just behind our ability to shoot the enemy ranks our skill at shooting ourselves in the foot. And even when our mistakes are honest and minor, they seem to find their way into the news. A reader recently sent me a link to a Columbia Journalism Review story about two photos that had been retracted by the Associated Press. Each photo showed one of two sergeants recently killed in Iraq in what appears to have been a case of fragging by a subordinate. The problem, noted by an alert editor at a newspaper in Texas, was that except for the faces and the nametags, the two images</description>
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			<pubDate>Thu, 25 Sep 2008 00:00:00 -0500</pubDate>
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			<title>What&apos;s Wrong With Weak States?</title>
			<description>By Janine Davidson Tom Johnson and M. Chris Mason have an excellent short piece, &quot;All Counterinsurgency Is Local,&quot; in the latest Atlantic magazine. They critique the NATO counterinsurgency strategy in Afghanistan for its ill-conceived emphasis on strengthening national-level governance and its disregard for the smaller districts, where the real center of gravity is for Afghan society. Politically and strategically, the most important level of governance in Afghanistan is neither national nor regional nor provincial. Afghan identity is rooted in the woleswali: the districts within each province that are typically home to a single clan or tribe. Historically, unrest has always bubbled up from this stratum-whether against Alexander, the Victorian British, or the Soviet Union. Yet the woleswali are last, not first, in U.S. military and political strategy. This is a simple, yet not-so-obvious observation. Despite headlines that emphasize military operations and chasing bad guys in Afghanistan and Iraq, at the</description>
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			<pubDate>Wed, 24 Sep 2008 00:00:00 -0500</pubDate>
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			<title>A Crisis of Competence</title>
			<description>By Shawn Brimley Like many of you, I&apos;ve spent the last week trying to wrap my mind around the woe on Wall Street, and how it will affect those of us on Main Street. I watched all the Sunday talk shows and read the press accounts, but I remain confused. Like a drooling idiot, I&apos;ve watched my portfolio take a hit, and while I am not persuaded by my financial advisor&apos;s advice to do nothing, that&apos;s exactly what I&apos;m doing. I fancy myself a decent national security analyst, but on this stuff I am, well, incompetent. There - I said it. I guess my dreams of being SEC Chairman are over! But seriously, it seems to me that the dramatic erosion of investor confidence stems from a profound crisis in national competence. We all share some collective blame here: for allowing sub-prime lending practices to get out of hand, for</description>
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			<pubDate>Tue, 23 Sep 2008 09:14:26 -0500</pubDate>
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			<title>Green on Green</title>
			<description>By Robert Bateman A recent article in The Post highlighted an interesting dustup between the Department of Defense and the Environmental Protection Agency. Apparently the Pentagon is considered the country&apos;s biggest polluter, with polluted military sites accounting for 10 percent of Superfund sites. Granted, some of those posts have been abandoned since 1919. But the EPA wants them cleaned up, and the Pentagon is on the hook. Fair enough. The question is how to make that happen. Deputy Undersecretary of Defense Wayne Arny told a Senate panel last week that some of the EPA&apos;s cleanup plans were &quot;excessive&quot; and that the Pentagon wanted to do its own thing. Sen. Barabara Boxer (D-Calif.) countered: &quot;I don&apos;t want the EPA making decisions on war strategy, and I don&apos;t want you making decisions on environmental cleanup, because you have an interest in the easiest way out.&quot; I&apos;m not a big fan of Boxer.</description>
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			<pubDate>Fri, 19 Sep 2008 17:45:16 -0500</pubDate>
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			<title>The Rains Fail</title>
			<description>By Clint Douglas Today&apos;s New York Times contains a particularly disturbing piece about the drought in Afghanistan and the looming certainty of widespread famine throughout the country this winter. Given the more attention grabbing and violent headlines coming out of Afghanistan and Pakistan, I doubt that this unwelcome news will receive the urgent attention that it deserves. However, if we fail to ensure that the Afghans don&apos;t starve this winter, then the resulting chaos will doom our efforts there. I deployed in Afghanistan in the winter of 2003, when the country was still relatively quiet. The Taliban were licking their wounds and the overwhelming superiority of American arms was fresh in the collective memory of the population. My first two months were spent in Kabul and I was afforded the opportunity to talk to many Afghans from varying ethnic backgrounds. When prodded about what had turned out to be a</description>
			<link>http://voices.washingtonpost.com/inteldump/2008/09/the_rains_fall.html?wprss=inteldump</link>
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			<category>Counterinsurgency</category>
			<pubDate>Fri, 19 Sep 2008 17:18:31 -0500</pubDate>
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			<title>Fridays in the Pentagon</title>
			<description>By Robert Bateman I wrote the following essay two years ago. Quite a few have probably seen this already. It was posted originally on MSNBC.com. It was later republished by a friend of mine, Joe Galloway, in his column for the McClatchy chain of newspapers. I offer it here again today for two simple reasons: It is a story that matters, and it is happening again right now, this very instant, not far away: It is 110 yards from the &quot;E&quot; ring to the &quot;A&quot; ring of the Pentagon. This section of the Pentagon is newly renovated; the floors shine, the hallway is broad, and the lighting is bright. At this instant the entire length of the corridor is packed with officers, a few sergeants and some civilians, all crammed tightly three and four deep against the walls. There are thousands here. This hallway, more than any other, is the</description>
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			<pubDate>Fri, 19 Sep 2008 12:05:54 -0500</pubDate>
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			<title>Hezbollah to the Rescue?</title>
			<description>By Clint Douglas In 2006, Hezbollah fought Israel to a bloody stalemate using what many analysts are calling &quot;hybrid-warfare,&quot; which lies somewhere between what we generally understand to be guerrilla and conventional warfare. Hezbollah fighters utilized sophisticated anti-tank and anti-ship missiles, as well as surprisingly secure high-tech communications systems, all the while maintaining a decentralized and dispersed organizational structure that remained resilient under continuous Israeli bombardment. Small mobile anti-tank teams proved elusive targets to both air and artillery attacks, and were highly effective in blunting the progress of Israel&apos;s armored columns. Hezbollah not only survived the contest, but emerged more powerful than ever. After Georgia&apos;s calamitous war with Russia, there has been discussion as to how we should help re-equip and re-train the Georgian army. Some have suggested that we learn from our adversaries and teach the Georgians how to apply some of these lessons from Hezbollah. In principle, this</description>
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			<pubDate>Thu, 18 Sep 2008 16:49:42 -0500</pubDate>
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			<title>Soldiers and Warriors</title>
			<description>By Robert Bateman GAAAA-RYYY OWEN, GARRYOWEN, GARRYOWEN, IN THE LITTLE BIGHORN VALLEY ALL ALONE, THERE&apos;LL BE BETTER DAYS TO BE, FOR THE SEVENTH CAVALRY, WHEN WE RIDE AGAIN FOR DEAR OLD GARRYOWEN! ~ To the tune of the 7th Cavalry tune &quot;Sergeant Flynn&quot; I am a Seventh Cavalry officer. I commanded in that most famous of American units, and my regimental affiliation and affections will always be with the men who wear the upturned horseshoe crest of that regiment. As a historian, and as perhaps the de facto regimental historian (since there is no such thing as a de jure position for this function), I am also very well acquainted with our legacy. The Seventh Cavalry was created to man the outposts of the frontiers in the wake of the Civil War, and to fight against the warrior cultures of the Native American tribes as need be. But in doing</description>
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			<pubDate>Thu, 18 Sep 2008 14:28:45 -0500</pubDate>
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			<title>Fighting Over the Future</title>
			<description>By Shawn Brimley Most defense analysts have been following the debate going on in military circles over what the future threat environment will look like and how to best prepare America&apos;s military. To those who may not be wonkish enough to follow the blow-by-blow in the pages of Armed Forces Journal or websites like Small Wars Journal or Abu Muqawama (all of which I highly recommend), I offer a short and dirty overview below. [Update: a reader notes that Andrew Bacevich cites the same three sites in an Atlantic Monthly piece, &quot;The Petraeus Doctrine.&quot;]</description>
			<link>http://voices.washingtonpost.com/inteldump/2008/09/fighting_over_the_future.html?wprss=inteldump</link>
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			<category>Counterinsurgency</category>
			<pubDate>Wed, 17 Sep 2008 16:02:46 -0500</pubDate>
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			<title>The New Man in Iraq</title>
			<description>By Colin Kahl Yesterday, General Ray Odierno took over the command of Multi-National Force-Iraq from General David Petraeus, who is leaving to become the head of Central Command. Odierno is one of the most controversial figures of the Iraq war, and he is taking over at a time of immense complexity. In 2003 and 2004, Odierno was a two-star general in command of the 4th Infantry Division (4th ID). The division &quot;owned&quot; much of the &quot;Sunni Triangle,&quot; including such insurgent hotbeds as Tikrit (Saddam Hussein&apos;s home town) and Samarra (the future site of the Golden Mosque bombing that kick-started Iraq&apos;s civil war in 2006). Odierno&apos;s troops were notorious for their heavy-handed tactics: They conducted indiscriminate sweeps of Sunni towns, arrested thousands of Sunni men, and were often accused of excessive force. The division&apos;s approach was devastatingly critiqued by Dexter Filkins in the New York Times Magazine, and Tom Ricks&apos; &apos;Fiasco&apos;</description>
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			<pubDate>Wed, 17 Sep 2008 09:52:26 -0500</pubDate>
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